This article attempts to shed some light on the French Sociological Law School, its doctrinal presuppositions, social surroundings, and different personal expressions, focusing then on the contribution to that doctrine of one of its major exponents, Nicholas Politis.
This type of construction had well suited the times of the Westphalian Society, after the Grotian effort to devise a new international legal order for a new international society of equal sovereigns. It first of all reflected the basic premise of the system, namely equal sovereignty and independence. Between independent persons there can be no imposition of law; otherwise these persons would not be independent, but rather subjected to the sway of some higher subject. Conversely, these persons may agree among themselves as to what the law should be. The agreement is the vehicle par excellence of some law-creation in a decentralized society. Moreover, the newly born states, once liberated from subjection to the Pope and Emperor, indulged themselves in a phase of power-politics, of expansion, and of war. A minimal international law, mostly restricted to the agreements between these states, perfectly fitted the demands of the day. Secondly, the positivistic thought allowed one to move beyond the mainly doctrinal construction of international law. Grotius and the other 'fathers' of modern international law attempted to draw up a new international legal order for independent and equal states by moving away from the tradition of supranationalism of the Middle Ages. To that end, they drew on the two sources of law they had at their disposal: the Roman law (nemo jurista, nisi romanista) and the natural law. Especially the natural law movement of their days gave them the freedom to devise rational principles for the new setting of sovereign states. It is of no surprise that these lawyers inspired themselves heavily by these natural law streams, which gave them so much freedom in shaping a new law of nations according to the dictate of 'right reason'. Hence, the first chairs of teaching of international law were at once chairs of natural and international law. As a result, classical international law was at its inception mainly doctrinal, not practical. Positivism allowed one progressively to move from 'theoretical speculations' towards the effective practice of states, and hence to mantle international law with the chrism of positivity. By the same token, historical and cultural facts were again instilled into the law at the place of abstract rational craftsmanship. Thirdly, the positivistic explanation could fit an international society such as that of the 19th century, where it had its heyday. This society was at once relatively calm and slowly moving. In it, conservatism prevailed. Positivism is a perfect expression of conservatism. What consent has done, only consent can dismantle. Since it is difficult to get the consent of all, the legal régimes tend to remain stable and to be sheltered against change. Slow motion prevails. Moreover, the 19th century was based on an international law at once of coexistence and of predatory conduct. Coexistence prevailed in peacetime. There was hardly any definition and promotion of common concerns of the international community. The law limited itself essentially to diplomacy, transactions (treaties), and war. Predatory conduct dominated in the fields of jura ad bellum and post bellum, since the use of force, the annexation of territory, colonialism, or unequal treaties were not prohibited. Coexistence and 'predation' need no more than power and agreements. Positivism perfectly fits the needs of such a society.
Things changed at the beginning of the 20th century. The World War had brought untold destruction and threats of future heavy turmoil. Moreover, interdependence had grown. Common concerns of the international community, spawning beyond the will and interest of states taken uti singuli or in small groups, had vigorously emerged. The great theme of the time was that the international society had to be 'organized' in order to extract it from the anarchy and rule of power into which it had hitherto plunged. To that end, great international organizations were devised and realized: the League of Nations, later the United Nations. Common concerns continued to grow during the whole of the 20th century: peaceful settlement of disputes for prevention of war, non-use of force, collective security, arms reduction and control, human rights, humanitarian law, protection of the environment, etc. It is quite obvious that the attempt to 'organize' international society -as in the past municipal society had been organized and steered towards the rule of law -supposed going beyond the all-powerful will of single states. A somewhat community-oriented international law must look beyond arbitrary agreements of states as the basis and the main expression of the legal order. Sic volo sic jubeo. . . cannot be the cardinal rule in the wake of such an effort of reconstruction. Firmer ground must be looked for. The essence became to bind states to some of such common concerns and the norms they give rise to. The crucial aspect was how to bind states without their consent in view of the pressing new needs of the international community. In that perspective, the ground of positivism had at least partially to be left behind. New doctrinal orientations became necessary on the grounds and basis of international obligation. The subjective explanation of the source of obligation (Rechtsgeschäft) had to yield to some form of objective construction (Recht). Sociological thought in international law has been one attempt to respond to this challenge of reconstruction of the legal order on the firmer ground of objectively valid norms, notwithstanding the individual will of this or that sovereign state, or indeed of this or that different drummer.
the state and to its arbitrary wills. It is a social product, forming itself through spontaneous social interaction. The legislator can only seize it, capture it, photograph it; he does not create it. Effectiveness of social behaviour is the ultimate source of law. Ubi societas, ibi jus. Hence, by the same token, sociological thought is predicated on a 'realistic' theory of law.
The state itself is often viewed with suspicion by these new sociological doctrines: it is too powerful; it imposes arbitrary wills; it tends to escape from the bounds of the rule of law. The true subjects (persons) of the law, the ones who really and not only metaphysically or metaphorically interact, are the individuals. Many international sociological theories hence concentrated on the individual as the true actor of the law and tended to discard the state. The state is just one society among innumerable others. The individual, on the contrary, is a true legal person, the ultimate point beneath which it is impossible to break down legal personality and social action. The sociological theories of the Inter-War period were thus essentially individualistic and opened up to an effort of establishing the pre-eminence of the (rule of) law, domestically and internationally.
The environment for such a sociological thought was particularly favourable in France.
2 Here there was a strong school of municipal sociological thought, reacting against the old 'Ecole de l'Exégèse' and the absolute Jacobinian state-model. Secondly, in France the positivistic tradition (since A. Compte) had triumphed. Sociologism was a means of fighting against state-centred and will-oriented positivism without giving up the anti-speculative and anti-metaphysical tradition. Thirdly, the French lawyers of the turn of the century were progress-oriented. Progress of civilization and science was a Leitbild. Sociological thought seemed to be the only way to achieve such progress in legal thought. Positivism had had its day. Natural law was still regarded as more old-fashioned and linked with the conservative Catholic Church. Only sociological thought truly broke new ground. Only it was 'progressive'.
Legal sociological thought can be construed more objectively or more subjectively. In a 'subjective' version, the ultimate test of the law is the legal conscience or conviction in the social forces. The law is what is socially 'recognized' as law. Opinio juris here plays the central role. This version of sociologism had been defended mainly in Germany (E. Bierling, M. Weber, E. Ehrlich). In an 'objective' version, the law is a conglomerate of social facts. For the French school, this conglomerate of facts was essentially based on social solidarity, i.e., the law is a product of material interdependencies of the social actors (economic, political, cultural, division of work, etc.). The law tends to flow directly and objectively from these social interactions. The legislator just draws the detailed consequences of it in his enactments. The two directions never remained completely separated. On the contrary, they often tended to merge into one another, with the only difference of accent. The French school of L. Duguit, G. Scelle, and N. Politis is pre-eminently rooted on the objective side of these theories. However, 2 See M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870 -1960 (2001 , at 266ff.
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Léon Duguit as the Spiritual Father of Politis' Doctrine
Nicolas Politis was inspired by one of his progressive teachers, Léon Duguit, a constitutional lawyer of great influence at the beginning of the 20th century. For Duguit 3 the basis of the law is the fact of 'solidarity' or of 'interdependence' between human beings. One may notice in passing how well that fundamental basis of the doctrine suited the needs of modern international law: common concerns and the construction of an objective international law -and 'solidarity'! For Duguit, the rules of the law spontaneously emerge from social contact based on solidarity, since without them social life and interaction itself would not be possible. These social rules, of a moral or economic character, become legal rules when they are internalized by the different individuals interacting as being necessary to their dealings. A slight subjective element here enters into Duguit's construction. This solidarity does not stop at the boundary of the state. It extends beyond. Hence an international law emerges. It becomes binding when the different social actors have developed the conscience (arising out of a social necessity) of the need to respect its rules. The opinio is here juris sive necessitatis. Municipal and international law thus possess the same legal basis. Both belong to the same legal system, which is monistic. The basis of all law is solidarity and social interaction. The circles of the solidarity differ, going from the most local (family) to the most ecumenical (world society), without any discontinuance. Law is thus ultimately based on a social fact being anterior and superior to human will. It is not created arbitrarily but flows from social solidarity.
This all too short summary of Duguit's thinking shows all the many ideas international lawyers such as G. Scelle and N. Politis took over from this construction. The distinctive contribution of G. Scelle and N. Politis was to adapt that thinking to international society. Duguit had thought mainly on the lines of municipal society. His consideration of international society is an addition and short. For Scelle and Politis, it obviously becomes central. G. Scelle developed the thinking of Duguit by giving it its most perfect theoretical expression for international society. N. Politis remained more strongly engaged in international practice, without however becoming a true 'practitioner'. He never gave a theoretically as developed expression of his doctrine as G. Scelle had done for his own. It is therefore necessary to collect passages in different of his writings in order to illustrate his way of thinking.
The Sociological Doctrine of N. Politis
It is mainly in two learned pieces of writing that N. Politis developed his sociological conception of international law. They are both situated in the middle of the 1920s, at the peak of his intellectual force and career. First, in his masterly Hague course on 'Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté et la théorie de l'abus des droits dans les rapports internationaux ' (1925) ; 4 secondly, in his monograph on 'Les nouvelles tendances du droit international ' (1927) . For reasons of space, we will quote some passages only of the first of these two writings.
In the Hague course, the following passages are particularly illuminating. They must be quoted in the original French, in order to keep their peculiar flavour and modality of expression. This is particularly true for an author like N. Politis, whose exceedingly elegant way of expression has for years prompted the greatest admiration of the present author: This seminal passage contains many insights. First, the rejection of speculation and metaphysics. The law is not about fictions, abstractions, or constructions. It is about 'reality' (this word occurs regularly in the text quoted, and it is always opposed to abstractions). The state itself is an abstraction. The international community as a society of states is a still greater fiction. Reality is simpler: the word 'simplement' also occurs twice at very symptomatic places. Law is solidarity of individuals interacting between themselves. Politis and the other sociologists have here a common trait with the transcendental school of H. Kelsen: the fight against metaphysical notions such as 'State', 'legal person', 'subjective rights', etc. The law is centred on the needs and life of individuals. It is freed from the oppressive mantle of a state as the eternal commander. The law is prior to and above the state. Secondly, the unity of the social phenomenon: international law has the same roots and subjects (persons) as municipal law, namely individuals; the legal phenomenon is necessarily monistic. Thirdly, there is the constant and subtly constructed opposition between the past and the present. In the past, legal doctrine was. . .; today, it is reconstructed along the following lines.... The impression thus created is that of a radical departure, of a revolution rather than an evolution. Behind this conception lurks the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century conception of constant progress of humans and civilization. The traditional image of the 'civilized states' was taken over in a larger framework to become that of a civilized international society and of a civilized international law. Fourthly, international law is no longer just the law between states, a political law, a jus inter postestates. It becomes a 'private international law' writ large, encompassing all relations of individuals transcending a national boundary. In this sense, the sociological doctrines are the forerunners of the more recent 'transnational law' currents. Summing up, Politis visibly adopts all main tenets of the sociological school of his day. He then goes on to say: This passage is heavily drawn from Duguit. It shows how (enlightened) public opinion becomes the essential tool for the effectiveness and enforcement of the modern international law. The individual is the main actor of international law. This law flows from its dealings and juridical consciousness. Hence, it is also sanctioned through the individual and its juridical conscience. A law not lived by and in that sense not sanctioned has ceased to be effective and thus has ceased to be law altogether. In turn, this just means that the solidarity which lies at its heart has ceased to exist or to be felt. In that sense too, law is and remains a piece of living reality and of constant movement. It is not a form, an enactment, legislation. It is a piece of (social) life.
The consequence of the preceding passages is that the state is neither a reality, nor can it -a fortiori -be sovereign. Politis hence passes on to a frontal attack against sovereignty. He sees in it the major obstacle to the development of a less anarchical international legal order. Moreover, he identifies sovereignty with the state as a 'commander', with its arbitrary power policy wills: '[c] 
Weaknesses of Sociological Theories
The sociological theories of the beginning of the 20th century, still quite rudimentary and all too optimistic, had two essential pitfalls.
First, the sometimes radical monism between the 'is' and the 'ought'. Why should all that is effectively being practised at a given time in the spontaneous interaction of social forces also represent what ought to be? Why can we say that members of society are bound by such rules? Can that which is bear in itself its own justification? This monism between effectiveness and the normative injunction tends to erode distinctions and criticism. Effectiveness becomes all: law (an 'ought') is deduced from the 'is' (facts of social life). Legitimacy and justice tend to be put aside -these are indeed partly metaphysical notions. However, it seems that they can never be completely put aside in the law, which is a cultural or finalist, and not just a causal or scientific, phenomenon? Manifestly, the 'juridical consciousness', in which feelings of justice and appropriateness have some place, somewhat relaxes the tension in the writings of Duguit and Politis. But these quite short and vague allusions do not completely dispose of the problem.
Secondly, the formal expression of the law is weakened, if not dissolved, in the vague space of social effectiveness. The social regularities invoked may be convenient for the political scientist. They are too vague for the lawyer. How will he determine the applicable law in a given case? The sociological school here needs the complement of a well-equipped doctrine of formal sources, i.e., of a well articulated positive law body. For the functioning of the law the legislator hence still plays a fundamental role. Some degree of 'positivism' thus also remains unavoidable in the realm of the sociological theories (as it does in natural law theories). In the end, these constructions and conceptions of the law can offer a definite solution only for the basis of obligation in international law, but not for the day-to-day working of this complex and articulated legal order.
For these reasons, sociological theories such as those exposed at the beginning of the 20th century remained a parenthesis in the doctrinal history of international law. They inspired other schools of law and were thus developed, but not maintained as such by modern authors.
